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Court Litigation over Arbitration Agreements: Is it Time for a New Default Rule?
Jack Graves*
(forthcoming in The American Review of International Arbitration, Volume 23).
Abstract
Court litigation over the existence or validity of arbitration agreements is a major threat to the
efficacy of international commercial arbitration. While New York Convention Article II(3)
requires a court to “refer the parties to arbitration” when faced with a valid and effective
arbitration agreement, it fails to provide any guidance with respect to the process for answering
that question, thus leaving the issue to national law. A recalcitrant respondent may, therefore,
have a variety of options for court challenges—based on a disparate array of national laws—in
seeking to delay or at least complicate any claims subject to arbitration. This paper briefly
surveys the problem, as well as a few current proposed solutions, and then proposes its own
novel solution in the form of a new convention making arbitration the default legal rule for
resolution of international commercial disputes.
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INTRODUCTION

Once upon a time, arbitration was seen as a means of avoiding courts in resolving parties‟
contract disputes. Today, however, an arbitration agreement all too often simply leads to a
second dispute over the forum for resolving the first. This often obstructive skirmish—on the
border between litigation and arbitration—arguably presents the single greatest threat to the
effectiveness of commercial, business-to-business arbitration today. This threat is particularly
acute in the context of international commercial arbitration, where recalcitrant parties may seek
to invoke the jurisdiction of a broad array of national courts, with a broad variety of views
regarding the proper role of courts with respect to the arbitral process. The primary tool for
dealing with the interaction between national courts and the arbitral process is the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) (the “New
York Convention” or “Convention”).
For over 50 years, the New York Convention has served two principle purposes, each of which
relates to the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate claims in lieu of bringing them in court.
Article II generally requires national courts to defer to agreed upon arbitration proceedings, and
Article III generally requires national courts to recognize and enforce any resulting arbitration
awards. This paper will focus on the former. To what extent are national courts precluded from
exercising jurisdiction over matters at least arguably subject to arbitration?
This question requires a review of the “negative” aspect of “competence-competence.” While
“positive” competence-competence provides an arbitral tribunal with the power to decide its own
jurisdiction, the negative version goes further in precluding a court from addressing this same
issue—at least as a preliminary matter. This negative version is subject to significant variation
under different national arbitration laws. Thus, parties challenging the jurisdiction of arbitrators
will often bring parallel challenges in court, adding to the overall cost of resolving the original
dispute and reducing the efficiency of arbitral process. This potential for parallel court
proceedings may also sometimes add further complexity and uncertainty to the process, such as
the issuance of anti-suit injunctions and questions with respect to the preclusive effect of any
given court determination on another, or on the arbitral process, itself. Concerns over these
issues have only been heightened in matters involving EU parties after the West Tankers
decision. All of this added complexity and uncertainty is seemingly at serious odds with the
simple efficiency often touted as one of arbitration‟s most basic virtues.
A strong version of “negative competence-competence” in Article II of the New York
Convention could negate much of any detrimental effect of these national variations. However,
the Convention‟s treatment of the issue in Article II(3), as drafted, is not sufficiently clear to
serve this purpose. This paper will, therefore, explore the potential for addressing this arguable
shortcoming of the Convention, also noting analogous attempts to “modernize” the “writing”
requirement of Article II(2). Initially, two obvious alternatives present themselves: (1) amend or
replace the New York Convention; or (2) provide interpretative guidance for the current
Convention language that is likely to achieve the desired result. Each is briefly explored herein.
This paper will, however, suggest a third alternative—a new convention designating arbitration
as the default means of resolving international commercial disputes.

2

A couple of years ago, in addressing the modern trend away from any formal writing
requirement, I initially suggested that perhaps it was time to start thinking about a convention
that recognized normative preferences for arbitration of international commercial disputes and
treated arbitration as the default legal rule—subject of course to any agreement to vest
jurisdiction in a specific national court.1 Ultimately, many of the court “skirmishes” around
enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate arise from the fact that national courts remain the
default forum—notwithstanding the “common wisdom” that arbitration is the norm for resolving
disputes arising from cross-border commercial transactions. It would, thus, seem logical that
disputes over the appropriate forum would be reduced by simply recognizing the normatively
preferred arbitration forum as the legal default rule.
2

LITIGATION OVER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND NEGATIVE
COMPETENCE-COMPETENCE

Likely the greatest single threat to modern commercial arbitration is the propensity of
recalcitrant respondents to bring court proceedings in hopes of delaying the resolution of claims
fairly subject to arbitration on the merits.2 To be sure, access to courts may often be valuable as
an ancillary aid to arbitration proceedings in cases, for example, requiring early interim relief or
eventual state-backed enforcement of an award.3 However, preemptive early court fights over
arbitral jurisdiction are largely unnecessary and expensive dead weight, often significantly
reducing the effectiveness and increasing the cost of the arbitral process.4 The only current way
to avoid this problem is through the consistent application of a strong form of negative
competence-competence, by virtue of which courts in any and all potentially available
jurisdictions shall refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the parties‟ dispute—save only to compel
the parties to arbitration.5 Unfortunately, the applicable legal doctrine governing the issue is
anything but consistent.
The problem of litigation over arbitration agreements is significantly exacerbated by disparate
national laws governing potential litigation of a matter arguably subject to arbitration—either
before the arbitral tribunal has been seized of the matter, or in parallel to the tribunal‟s
deliberations (Part 2.1). In particular, the issue has become a very serious one in arbitration
involving EU parties, based on recent decisions by the European Court of Justice applying the
Brussels I Regulation to actions requesting court determination of whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate (Part 2.2). The obvious solution to such a disparity among national laws is to look to the
1

Jack Graves, ICA and the Writing Requirement: Following Modern Trends towards Liberalization or Are We Stuck
in 1958? 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 36 (Int‟l ed. 2009). I first heard this rather novel proposition in a talk delivered by
Eugen Salpius, a former President of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (2005), when I invited him to speak at
Stetson University School of Law in early 2005. See id., fn 27. Gilles Cuniberti has also made a very similar
proposal. See generally, Gilles Cuniberti, Beyond Contract—the Case for Default Arbitration in International
Commercial Disputes, 32 FORDHAM INT‟L L. J. 417 (2009). See also generally KARIM YOUSSEF, CONSENT IN
CONTEXT: FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2009) (suggesting arbitration as a normative
default in the context of challenges arising in complex, multi-party commercial disputes).
2
See Jack Graves, Arbitration as Contract: The Need for a Fully Developed and Comprehensive Set of Statutory
Default Legal Rules, 2 WILLIAM & MARY BUS. L. REV. 227, 242 (2011).
3
See W. Michael Reisman and Heide Iravani, The Changing Relation of National Courts and International
Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. OF INT‟L ARB. 5, 7 (2010).
4
Id.
5
Id.
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New York Convention and Article II(3), which requires a court of any signatory country to “refer
the parties to arbitration” if they have agreed to arbitrate, “unless it finds said agreement is null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. However, the scope of such inquiry is left
unanswered by the Convention, thus largely leaving the issue to local national law (Part 2.3).
2.1

THE BASIC PROBLEM AND AN ARRAY OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

An arbitration agreement includes an express positive promise to arbitrate any dispute within its
scope. However, it also includes an implied negative promise not to go to court—except in aid of
the arbitral process.6 The doctrine of “negative” competence-competence gives effect to this
implied negative promise by limiting the authority of a national court to consider a matter
arguably subject to arbitration prior to the arbitral tribunal‟s determination of whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate the dispute in question. This negative version of competence-competence is
particularly important, because it often provides the only means by which the parties can enforce
the benefit of their implied bargain not to go to court. The effectiveness of an anti-suit injunction
is often questionable7—especially in civil law jurisdictions8—and a claim for damages for breach
of the arbitration agreement is often difficult to quantify.
In its strongest form, the doctrine precludes any court consideration of a question then subject to
ongoing arbitration proceedings.9 Early attempts to delay the proceedings are thereby
discouraged; the parties are able to proceed in arbitration to a prompt and efficient resolution of
their dispute on the merits; and any challenge to the arbitration agreement—and the resulting
jurisdiction of the arbitrators—is generally fully preserved for later review by a court, if
necessary.10 However, national laws on negative competence-competence differ significantly.11
A brief sample of the variety of disparate approaches to the issue are surveyed by reference to
French law (Part 2.1.1); U.S. law (Part 2.1.2); English law (Part 2.1.3); the UNCITRAL Model
Law (Part 2.1.4); and German law (Part 2.1.5).
2.1.1

A Strong Version of Negative Competence-Competence

French law provides the strongest modern statutory version of competence-competence today.
Prior to the constitution of the tribunal, after which the arbitrators are deemed seized of the
dispute at issue,12 a court shall decline jurisdiction, unless “the arbitration agreement is
manifestly void or manifestly not applicable.”13 If a court is presented with prima facie evidence
6

See Julian Lew, Does National Court Involvement Undermine the International Arbitration Process? 24 AM. U.
INT‟L L. REV. 489, 491 (2009) (explaining that a positive choice of final and binding arbitration is also a negative
rejection of court adjudication).
7
See MARGARET MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 92-100
(2008).
8
GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 1041-43 (2009).
9
This preclusion of court consideration during ongoing arbitral proceedings is typically subject to an exception
where the tribunal has answered any jurisdictional challenge in a preliminary decision. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model
Law on Int‟l Commercial Arbitration, Article 16(3).
10
A party who initially challenges jurisdiction and loses its challenge before the arbitrators, but subsequently wins
on the merits of the dispute will of course be unlikely to challenge that decision later in court.
11
GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 1031 (2009)
12
French Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV, Title I, Chapter I, Article 1456.
13
French Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV, Title I, Chapter I, Article 1448 (emphasis supplied).
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of an arbitration agreement between these parties that might reasonably include the dispute
within its scope, then the court must decline jurisdiction. If the arbitral tribunal is already seized
of the matter, then the court must decline jurisdiction without any review of the issue at that
time.14 Notably, French law no longer requires a written arbitration agreement,15 so this prima
facie test for a “manifest” lack of a valid and applicable arbitration agreement may present
interesting challenges in its application to a purported oral arbitration agreement, the existence of
which is contested. Whatever its new challenges, however, the French approach has traditionally
provided consistently strong support for arbitration and minimal opportunities for delay through
court proceedings.
2.1.2

An Absolute (?) Version of Contractual Competence-Competence

The United States Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”)16 makes absolutely no provision for
competence-competence—either positive or negative.17 Instead, section 4 provides solely for
court determination of any question as to whether the parties agreed to arbitration.18 However,
the United States Supreme Court has endorsed a contractual version of competence-competence,
which arguably gives the arbitral tribunal not only the first word on jurisdiction, but also the
last.19 One might argue that this U.S. version gives rise to a stronger “negative” preclusion of
court litigation than even the French approach. However, its precise contours are likely to be
further litigated for some time to come.20 Perhaps most importantly, the continuing need to resort
to the courts for statutory “guidance” under the FAA21 arguably undermines its effectiveness as a
tool to give effect to the parties‟ implied desire to stay out of court.22
2.1.3

A Flexible Version of Negative Competence-Competence

The English approach provides significant autonomy to the parties and, in certain circumstances,
discretion to the arbitral tribunal to allow for early court determination of whether the parties

14

French Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV, Title I, Chapter I, Article 1448.
French Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV, Title II, Article 1507.
16
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307.
17
JACK GRAVES AND YELENA DAVYDAN, COMPETENCE-COMPETENCE—AMERICAN STYLE in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: SYNERGY, CONVERGENCE AND EVOLUTION, 158 (Kroll,
Mistelis, Perales and Rogers, eds. 2011).
18
9 U.S.C. § 4.
19
See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson , 130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010); JACK GRAVES AND YELENA DAVYDAN,
COMPETENCE-COMPETENCE—AMERICAN STYLE in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL LAW: SYNERGY, CONVERGENCE AND EVOLUTION, 166-67 (Kroll, Mistelis, Perales and Rogers, eds.
2011) (elaborating on the broader likely effect of the Rent-A-Center decision).
20
Id.
21
See generally Margaret Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How The Supreme Court Created a Federal
Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006); Allied Bruce Terminix Co. v
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O‟Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court had long ago
“abandoned all pretence of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by
case, an edifice of its own creation”).
22
See Jack Graves, Arbitration as Contract: The Need for a Fully Developed and Comprehensive Set of Statutory
Default Legal Rules, 2 WILLIAM & MARY BUS. L. REV. 227, 266-67 (2011).
15
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have agreed to arbitrate a dispute. However, absent mutual consent of the parties or the consent
of the arbitrators, early court consideration is barred.23
2.1.4

The Lack of a Clear Standard under the UNCITRAL Model Law

The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Model Law”)
addresses the issue in Article 8. However, Article 8(1) provides little, if any guidance on the
extent of any limits on early court consideration of the parties‟ purported arbitration agreement.
Like New York Convention Article II(3), it requires any court to “refer the parties to arbitration”
if they have agreed to arbitrate, “unless it finds said agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed.” However, the scope of such inquiry is not addressed. Article 8(2)
seemingly goes further in expressly providing for the potential of parallel court proceedings,
inasmuch as it allows both arbitration and court consideration of the arbitration agreement
concurrently. As such, Model Law Article 8 provides only for a rather weak version of negative
competence-competence and is, arguably, of less value in preventing unnecessary litigation over
the arbitration agreement.
2.1.5

An Option for Early Court Determination of Jurisdiction

The German approach begins with the Model Law formulation described above, but adds a
significant twist.24 While section 1032(1) German Code of Civil Procedure adopts the language
of Article 8(1) of the Model Law, section 1032(2) allows either party to seek a declaratory court
judgment with respect to the purported arbitration agreement—as long as the action is
commenced before the tribunal is constituted.25 Thus, a party against whom a claim is brought in
arbitration will virtually always have the opportunity to institute an early court challenge,
assuming it does so promptly. The French and German approaches to negative competencecompetence arguably represent two ends of a diverse spectrum of approaches within Europe.26
Whatever the previous challenges of this disparity among national laws, much worse was yet to
come in the application of the Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the “Brussels I Regulation”) to
court proceedings involving agreements to arbitrate.
2.2

THE BASIC PROBLEM—JURISDICTION BRUSSELS I STYLE

The Brussels I Regulation provides for a lis pendens rule giving sole jurisdiction to the court first
seized.27 Whatever the pros or cons of this approach to jurisdiction in litigation, generally, the
Brussels I Regulation further provides that it “shall not apply to arbitration.”28 However, in the
23

English Arbitration Act (1996), Article 32; KLAUS SACHS AND NILS SCHMIDT-AHRENDTS, DIVERGING CONCEPTS
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETENCE-COMPETENCE? in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, 10 (Muller and Rigozzi, eds. 2010).
24

See German Code of Civil Procedure of 1998 (“ZPO”), section 1032.
KLAUS SACHS AND NILS SCHMIDT-AHRENDTS, DIVERGING CONCEPTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETENCECOMPETENCE? in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 8 (Muller and Rigozzi, eds.
2010).
26
Id. at 14-15.
27
Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, Articles 27-29.
28
Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, Article 2(d).
25
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much discussed (and largely maligned—at least within the arbitration community) West Tankers
decision, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held that an injunction issued by the
English High Court barring litigation of the arbitration agreement in a previously commenced
Italian court action was incompatible with the Brussels I Regulation—notwithstanding the fact
that England was the seat of arbitration.29
While the European Court of Justice agreed that the arbitration proceedings giving rise to the
anti-suit injunction were outside of the scope of Brussels I, it further suggested that Brussels I
may nevertheless preclude proceedings that “have consequences which undermine its
effectiveness.”30 The Court went on to find that the previously filed Italian court action was
subject to the exclusivity protection provided by Brussels I, and the English injunction would
undermine that protection.31 Thus, the injunction was incompatible with the Brussels I
Regulation.
The West Tankers case left open a further troubling question. Could the courts of the seat of
arbitration be deprived of jurisdiction to decide whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate if
another court decided the issue first? This question was answered in the affirmative in National
Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA.32 A Spanish court‟s determination that the parties had
not incorporated into their contract an agreement providing for arbitration seated in England
precluded any English Court from taking up the question and required dismissal of the arbitration
proceedings.33
Predictably, West Tankers and its progeny have led to numerous calls to amend the Brussels I
Regulation.34 However, reaching agreement on the nature of such an amendment has been more
difficult and subject to significant divergence in approaches. Most proposals seem to fall into
two basic categories: (1) within the Brussels I Regulation, grant the courts of the seat the sole
authority to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; or (2) clarify the unequivocal
inapplicability of Brussels I to any matter in any way related to a matter subject to arbitration.
Unfortunately, neither is without its challenges.
Soon after the West Tankers decision, the EU Commission published a “green paper” on the
review of the Brussels I Regulation.35 The green paper had been well underway prior to West
Tankers and, inter alia, addressed “[t]he interface between the Regulation and arbitration,” based
on a series of recommendations contained in the earlier 2007 Heidelberg Report.36 The green
29

West Tankers, Inc. v. Allianz SpA, Case C-185/07, Court of Justice of the European Communities (10 Feb. 2009).
Id. at 1156-57.
31
Id. at 1157.
32
English Court of Appeal, 2 C.L.C. 1004 (2009).
33
See id. Such a result was, of course, fully predictable based on the rationale of West Tankers. See KLAUS SACHS
AND N ILS SCHMIDT-AHRENDTS, DIVERGING CONCEPTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETENCE-COMPETENCE? in NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 20 (Muller and Rigozzi, eds. 2010).
34
See, e.g., generally Guido Carducci, Arbitration, Anti-Suit Injunctions and Lis Pendens under the European
Jurisdiction Regulation and the New York Convention, 27 ARBITRATION INT‟L 171 (2011).
35
Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM (2009) 175.
36
KLAUS SACHS AND NILS SCHMIDT-AHRENDTS, DIVERGING CONCEPTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETENCECOMPETENCE? in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 2-3 (Muller and Rigozzi,
eds. 2010).
30
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paper proposed to expand, selectively, the applicability of Brussels I to the extent its application
would enhance and improve the efficacy of various court proceedings in support of arbitration.37
It further proposed to grant priority to courts of the seat in determining whether the parties had
agreed to arbitrate the dispute in question,38 a provision that would have likely avoided the West
Tankers problem. However, the proposals contained in the green paper were protested by much
of the international arbitration community. They were also firmly rejected in the report of the
Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, which took the position that the whole
matter of arbitration should be excluded from the scope of the Regulation.39
In the EU Commission‟s proposal to amend the Regulation, published in December 2010, the
only change related to arbitration was the addition of a new Article 29(4).40 This provision would
require any court before which jurisdiction is contested on the basis of a purported arbitration
agreement to stay jurisdiction in favor of court or arbitral proceedings in the seat of arbitration
and to decline jurisdiction where the existence, validity, and effect of the arbitration agreement
have been established.41 This proposal, essentially, took direct aim at the West Tankers decision
and its potential to create “incentives for abusive litigation tactics” and thereby undermine the
efficacy of the arbitral process.42 The divergence of views as to the desirability of any interface
between arbitration and the Regulation was also recognized.43 However, the proposal ultimately
provided this limited interface in hopes that it would “enhance the effectiveness of arbitration
agreements in Europe, prevent parallel court and arbitration proceedings, and eliminate incentive
for abusive litigation tactics.”44 Strongly divergent views nevertheless remain,45 and a brief
exploration of a few of the issues is useful.
The arbitration community is strongly protective of the New York Convention and will resist
anything that might be seen as potentially undermining its effectiveness. To the extent that the
Brussels I Regulation applies, in any way, to arbitration, the potential for conflict with the
Convention naturally increases. For example, to the extent that the Regulation gives priority to a
determination of the seat with respect to arbitral jurisdiction, would the application of the
Regulation preclude the French practice of sometimes recognizing an award set aside in the seat
37

Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM (2009) 175, at 8-9, para. 7. Such proceedings
might include provisional measures, which would be vested exclusively in the seat of arbitration. Additionally, a
judgment merging an arbitration award might be given effect under the Regulation.
38
Id.
39
KLAUS SACHS AND NILS SCHMIDT-AHRENDTS, DIVERGING CONCEPTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETENCECOMPETENCE? in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 23 (Muller and Rigozzi,
eds. 2010).
40
European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), COM (2010) 748.
The proposal would also amend Article 2 to provide for the applicability of the Regulation to arbitration solely as
reflected in Article 29(4), as well as the accompanying provision of Article 33(3) defining when a tribunal is first
seized of a matter.
41
Id. at 36, Article 29(4).
42
Id. at 4.
43
Id. at 5.
44
Id. at 9, para. 3.1.4.
45
See Draft Report of the European Parliament on the Regulation (recast) COM (2010) 748, dated 28 June, 2011
(continuing to reject any application of the Regulation to proceedings subject to arbitration).

8

of arbitration?46 The New York Convention certainly allows this, but the proposed amendment to
the Brussels I Regulation might not. After West Tankers, the potential for unexpected
consequences of the application of Brussels I to arbitration are of course only heightened.
The focus on giving priority to the arbitral seat is also subject to a potential flaw in that it
assumes one can easily and immediately identify the seat. To the extent that the seat is clearly
designated in the parties‟ agreement, this assumption is reasonable—but what if it is not? What if
the parties fail to designate a seat or leave some ambiguity as to their choice? Typically, in such
circumstances, the arbitrators will determine the seat,47 and one might not necessarily be able to
determine the seat prior to that time. Thus, any approach that focuses on the seat in attempting to
prevent abusive early litigation will necessarily sometimes fail.
In contrast, an approach clarifying that the whole matter of arbitration is excluded from the scope
of the Brussels I Regulation would entail complete reliance on national law and the New York
Convention. We‟ve already discussed, above, the divergence in national laws with respect to the
negative doctrine of competence-competence, so this brings us to a more thorough examination
of the issue under the Convention.
2.3

THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AND ARTICLE II(3)

The New York Convention has, without a doubt, formed the bedrock foundation upon which
modern arbitration has been built. No one would seriously question its value in making
arbitration awards broadly enforceable across national borders in most countries around the
globe. Article III of the Convention provides for recognition and enforcement of an award,
subject to simplified procedures contained in Article IV and a very narrow set of exceptions
contained in Article V. This “enforcement” mechanism, operating in concert with the perceived
neutrality of the process, is absolutely essential for effective international commercial arbitration.
However, effective international commercial arbitration also requires a legal framework in which
courts in any and all potentially available jurisdictions will predictably and consistently refuse to
exercise jurisdiction over the parties‟ dispute—save only to compel the parties to arbitration.48
The broad applicability of the New York Convention would seem to make it an ideal candidate
for this role. Unfortunately, Article II(3) of the Convention is not particularly effective in this
respect.49 In fact, it is worth noting here that the European Court of Justice, in West Tankers, had
little problem in stating that its decision in support of the Italian Court‟s jurisdiction to consider

46

KLAUS SACHS AND NILS SCHMIDT-AHRENDTS, DIVERGING CONCEPTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETENCECOMPETENCE? in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 18-19 (Muller and Rigozzi,
eds. 2010).
47
See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), Article 20; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Article 18.
48
See W. Michael Reisman and Heide Iravani, The Changing Relation of National Courts and International
Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. OF INT‟L ARB. 5, 7 (2010).
49
See Guido Carducci, Arbitration, Anti-Suit Injunctions and Lis Pendens under the European Jurisdiction
Regulation and the New York Convention, 27 ARBITRATION INT‟L 171, 174 (2011) (in addressing European reliance
on the New York Convention to address the West Tankers issue, noting that the Convention has been far more
effective in terms of enforcement of arbitration awards and far less so in terms of avoiding parallel national court
jurisdiction).
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fully the existence, validity and scope of the arbitration agreement was fully consistent with
Article II(3) of the Convention.50
Article II(3) is crystal clear in requiring a court to refer the parties to arbitration in a proper case.
However, it provides no guidance as to the appropriate methodology or extent of any inquiry by
the court.51 Should a court refuse to consider any case in which the arbitrators are seized of the
matter? And what does it mean for the arbitrators to be “seized of the dispute”? Does this occur
only after the tribunal has been fully constituted, as provided by French law?52 Or does it occur
as soon as the process of constituting the tribunal has begun, as provided by the proposed
amendment to the Brussels I Regulation?53 Or might a tribunal even be deemed seized upon
“commencement” of arbitration proceedings? The question becomes even more problematic if
court litigation is commenced before an arbitral tribunal is seized of the matter (however
“seized” or “seised” might be defined).
Where a party seeks dismissal of a court action arguing that the dispute is subject to an
arbitration agreement, what is the proper level of court inquiry at this time? Should the court
make a full determination of the issue, or should it simply conduct a prima facie review, staying
or declining jurisdiction unless the lack of an effective arbitration agreement is “manifest.” This
standard of review is particularly important in cases like West Tankers, where the court in
question is not a court of the seat of arbitration. While one might reasonably argue in favor an
early court determination by a court of the seat, as provided for under German law, there is rarely
any redeeming basis for early review by any other court. In the vast majority of cases, another
court may solely address the arbitration agreement in the context of an enforcement proceeding.
However, the availability of court litigation outside of the seat provides ample opportunity for
mischief and abuse in efforts to delay proper arbitration proceedings.
While a discussion of global comparative court jurisdiction is far beyond the scope of this article,
it can safely be said that, absent an arbitration agreement, any given commercial dispute will
typically be subject to the jurisdiction of at least two different courts.54 A recalcitrant respondent,
therefore, need only choose the “least expeditious” court from among those with potential
jurisdiction and then contest the existence, validity, or scope of the arbitration agreement before
that court—potentially delaying the ultimate resolution of the dispute for an indeterminate period
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of time.55 The New York Convention, as drafted, provides little, if any, assistance in preventing
this particular problem.
There is also a relatively new—and particularly thorny—issue that is worth noting at this
juncture. Even if a court is willing to limit its review under Article II(3) to a prima facie inquiry,
what is the nature of a prima facie review of a purported oral agreement to arbitrate? Modern
arbitration law increasingly recognizes such oral arbitration agreements.56 However, resolving a
factual dispute over what was said between the parties would seemingly require a far deeper
inquiry than simply reviewing the language of a purported written agreement. Even more
importantly, the New York Convention does not recognize oral agreements to arbitrate under
Article II(2), so Article II(3) would not be available to a party challenging court proceedings
over a matter subject to an oral arbitration agreement. In fact, Articles II(2) and II(3) arguably
present the strongest basis for any suggestion that it may be time to consider amending the New
York Convention.
3

ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM THROUGH ARTICLE II(3) OF THE
NEW YORK CONVENTION

To the extent we wish to provide for a uniform and consistent solution to the problem of court
litigation over arbitration agreements, the New York Convention seemingly provides the ideal
vehicle in terms of its extraordinarily broad application. However, in attempting to resolve the
issue through the Convention, we face two significant challenges. First, how do we specifically
propose to solve the problem (Part 3.1)? Second, how do we bring about the selected approach
under the Convention (Part 3.2)?
3.1

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

To some degree, the range of potential solutions under the New York Convention mirrors some
of those being considered with respect to the West Tankers issue under Brussels I. Should a court
be limited to a prima facie review? Should a court be required to conduct any review of the
arbitration agreement under the law of the arbitral seat? Should exclusive jurisdiction be vested
in the courts of the seat?
At the ICCA International Arbitration Conference in 2008, Albert Jan van den Berg proposed, on
the fiftieth birthday of the New York Convention, that the time had come for its
“modernization.”57 The very first issue he raised was the revision of Articles II(3).58 His
hypothetical draft revision would require any court to refer the parties to arbitration, absent proof
that “there is prima facie no valid arbitration agreement under the law of the country where the
55
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award will be made.”59 There is certainly some merit to this “choice of law” approach, inasmuch
as any subsequent enforcement proceedings would necessarily address any challenge to the
arbitration agreement under the law of the place in which the award was made.60 However, it
also raises a number of difficult issues.
At the same 2008 conference, Emmanuel Gaillard put forth the opposing view that the New York
Convention should be left in its current form.61 He further suggested that, even if one were to
revise the Convention, any focus on the “law of the seat” was ill advised.62 As explained earlier
in addressing EU proposals to limit jurisdiction to the courts of the seat, the seat of any
arbitration may not yet be known at the time of any court consideration.63 Moreover, the
application of what will likely be foreign law is often difficult and may require lengthy hearings,
perhaps including experts, to determine its content.64 Finally, the recent Dallah decision reminds
us that two different courts may reach inconsistent results, even when purporting to apply the
same body of law.65
While agreeing with the prima facie standard of review proposed by van den Berg, Gaillard
suggested a “simple assessment on the basis of generally accepted practices,” in lieu of a
potentially more challenging and lengthy attempt to apply a specific national law.66 There is
indeed much to be said for such a simple, generic approach to a prima facie review. However, it
fails to address at least one major issue—that of oral agreements to arbitrate.
It is doubtful that the recognition and validation of oral arbitration agreements is yet a “generally
accepted practice.” Thus, a German court, for example, might find an arbitration agreement
formally invalid in its prima facie review—notwithstanding the fact that a court in the French
seat of the arbitration would not impose any form requirement.67 Admittedly, the German court
might then go on to evaluate the purported arbitration agreement in greater detail, assuming it
59
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could determine the seat and apply its law to any full determination. However, this “simple”
approach to a prima facie review is not necessarily as “simple” as it might first appear.
Alternatively, instead of focusing on the standard of review, the Convention could be amended to
grant exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the seat of arbitration,68 effectively providing for an
anti-suit injunction barring any other courts from addressing the issue.69 This approach avoids
any problems associated with choice of law or standard of review. It doesn‟t necessarily preclude
early resort to the courts on the issue of arbitral jurisdiction, as in the case of a German seat, but
that is a choice within the control of the parties when they choose a seat. Early court resolution—
in that instance—therefore seems more consistent with the parties‟ agreement.
This exclusive jurisdiction approach, however, remains subject to problems when the seat is not
yet known. Moreover, the exclusive jurisdiction approach may bar a court from addressing the
arbitration agreement70—even if it involves a local citizen and a matter of fundamental public
policy that would invalidate the arbitration agreement.71 Presumably, such a jurisdictional bar
would be subject to a reasonable array of exceptions. However, the contours of such exceptions
may be very difficult to define in a manner that doesn‟t simply reopen the door for mischievous
“torpedoes.”
In short, there is no single, easy answer to the question of how to remedy the current deficiencies
of Article II(3). However, even if agreement can be reached regarding desirable changes, one
must yet determine how to bring about these changes.
3.2

MEANS FOR BRINGING ANY SOLUTION ABOUT

Any proposal for actual modification of the existing language of the New York Convention is
typically met with strong resistance. When UNCITRAL revised the writing requirement of
Model Law, Article 7, in 2006, some suggested that the writing requirement of Article II(2) of
the New York Convention ought to be modified in order to bring it in line with modern trends, as
reflected in revised Article 7—at least as to Option I.72 However, amending the actual language
68
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of the Convention was deemed too difficult at the time. Instead, along with the revision of
Article 7, UNCITRAL included a resolution recommending an interpretation of the existing
language of Article II(2) of the Convention in a manner that might, essentially, be more
consistent with revised Article 7 of the Model Law.73 Perhaps, a similar approach might be taken
with respect to Article II(3) of the Convention.
A resolution promulgated by UNCITRAL could certainly stipulate, for example, a prima facie
standard of review, which might be equally useful with respect to the analogous language in
Article 8(1) of the Model Law. The actual language of Article II(3) of the Convention would not
require any change, and the challenge of amending a Convention with more than 140 signatories
would be avoided. The problem, of course, with this proposed solution is the questionable effect
of a simple interpretive resolution. To the extent that one seeks to use Article II(3) to bar abusive
litigation as a delaying tactic, adding further uncertainty to the process seems unwise.
Arguably, any effective change in the treatment of the issues addressed (or not addressed) by
Article II(3) of the Convention will likely have to come through amendment, as recently
suggested by Albert Jan van den Berg. However, if one is going to attempt to overcome all of the
near certain difficulties of revising this 50+ year old foundation of international commercial
arbitration, perhaps one should “think big” in hopes of finding an approach that might take us
through at least the next 50 years.
4

ARBITRATION AS A DEFAULT IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE

The commencement of court litigation of a matter subject to arbitration is often characterized as
a “torpedo” intended to “sink” or at least complicate and delay the arbitration proceedings.74
Guido Carducci explains in a recent article addressing, inter alia, the problem of such
“torpedoes.”
Preventing the „torpedoing‟ of international arbitration should be supported.
However, it is a fact that preventing „torpedoes‟ which operate by selected court
proceedings finds in its way the principle of judicial protection for regularly filed
claims, which opposes any „torpedo net.‟75
In short, this “torpedo” is often effective in thwarting international commercial arbitration
proceedings because the applicable legal framework fails to recognize arbitration as the default
mechanism for such “regularly filed claims” Instead, the current default jurisdictional rule for
“regularly filed claims” involving international commercial transactions is national courts—a
default that is fully inconsistent with normative practices. Instead of attempting to weave an ever
tighter torpedo net against a contrary default mechanism for resolving international commercial
disputes in court, why not simply recognize the obvious and make arbitration the default? With a
default rule providing for arbitration, a court would have no basis for exercising jurisdiction
absent an affirmative agreement of the parties. Thus, the effectiveness of court actions as a
73
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means to delay or obstruct arbitration proceedings would be substantially diminished, if not
largely eliminated.
Arbitration is almost certainly the normative method for resolving disputes in the majority of
international commercial transactions.76 As such, this normative reality should be recognized
through a default legal rule providing for arbitration in the absence of any agreement to the
contrary (Part 4.1). While such a change of the default rule from national courts to arbitration
would certainly be significant, the change could arguably be accomplished with a few relatively
small steps beyond the status quo (Part 4.2).
4.1

ARBITRATION AS THE DEFAULT

“[I]nternational arbitration is the natural and preferred means of resolving international business
disputes.”77 Arbitration is uniquely suited to cross border commercial transactions in that it
provides for neutral resolution of disputes and effective enforcement of resulting awards. It also
“typically produces efficient, expert resolution” of these disputes.78 Thus, “there are serious
reasons to presume, as a general matter and absent contrary indications, that commercial parties
are predisposed to enter into international arbitration agreements, in order to obtain the benefits
that such agreements provide.”79
The quotations in the foregoing paragraph are drawn from Gary Born‟s spirited defense of a
“presumption” in favor of arbitration, in lieu of a more “neutral” approach, such as that applied
to the issue of consent in contracts, generally.80 Born makes clear, however, that “„a party cannot
be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit,‟ and that
pro-arbitration policies cannot substitute for the parties‟ consent.”81 Or can they? Or, more to the
point, could consent be defined more broadly than one might initially intuit?
Consent might be found in a variety of contexts. Parties to a particular contract may be deemed
to have impliedly consented to certain majoritarian normative terms. Consent may also be
triggered by a positive rule of law. Each of these bases of consent is more fully explored below.
76
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4.2

A SMALL, THOUGH SIGNIFICANT, STEP BEYOND THE STATUS QUO

A knowledgeable observer of U.S. jurisprudence interpreting and applying the Federal
Arbitration Act might reasonably argue that, as a practical matter, the courts have already left
consent far behind in deciding issues of arbitral jurisdiction.82 For example, a party who chooses
institutional arbitration seated in the United States under the ICDR Rules is deemed to have
“clearly and unmistakably consented” to delegate any jurisdictional decision to the arbitrators—
and arguably has given up any right to ever raise the issue in court—solely by virtue of a
provision within the chosen institutional rules.83 U.S. Consumers are often deemed to have
“consented” to arbitration agreements that are largely unread, generally misunderstood, and often
provided after the consumer‟s agreement to take and pay for the goods or services in question.84
Nor is the U.S. approach particularly out of the mainstream, with respect to business-to-business
commercial arbitration. Under all modern national arbitration laws, a party whose contractual
consent is induced by fraud is deemed to have “consented” to the arbitration clause within the
main contract.85 Perhaps even more remarkably, a compulsory application by an athlete to
compete in his or her chosen sport binds the athlete to arbitration of any related disputes before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport.86 In short, real “consent” arguably ceased to be the touchstone
of arbitration law some time ago.87
Any general “pro-arbitration” presumption of consent is likely even stronger in the case of
international commercial arbitration. Thus, it would seem to be a relatively small step from the
current presumption to a fully independent presumption of “consent” to arbitration of an
international commercial dispute, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary (Part 4.2.1).
Moreover, the basic outlines of a possible template for a default legal regime can be found in the
existing Panama Convention (Part 4.2.2).
4.2.1

A Significant, and Perhaps Controversial, Presumption of “Consent”

Any suggestion for treatment of arbitration as a “default rule” for dispute resolution raises
obvious and significant questions regarding “consent.” It is often repeated that consent is the
cornerstone of arbitration, and this same “consent” mantra was recently invoked by Professor
Alan Scott Rau in seemingly dismissing the idea of a rule making arbitration the default means
82
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of international commercial dispute resolution as a proposal “displaying analytical confusion.”88
However, “consent” comes in many forms.
An international commercial transaction is always based on consent, as a matter of universal
contract law. The vast majority of contract regimes provide a broad array of default terms,
typically based on normative business behavior.89 In one respect, an agreement to arbitrate
disputes arising under the parties‟ main contract is no more than a typical majoritarian default
contract term provided in a variety of contractual contexts.90 Admittedly, this is arguably
inconsistent with the doctrine of separability, but that doctrine would be rendered largely
unnecessary if arbitration were the default.91
Moreover, tacit “consent” may be found in the parties‟ failure to contract around an established
default legal rule, provided (1) the parties had reason to know of the default rule; and (2) the cost
of contracting around the default rule is not prohibitive.92 Any effective default rule providing
for international commercial would almost certainly have to take the form of a well promoted
and publicized convention, so international business people would seemingly have reason to
know of its existence. While negotiating a dispute resolution provision can sometimes have
higher than normal transaction costs, the availability of the Hague Convention of Choice of
Court Agreement, providing a well-structured legal regime for agreeing on court adjudication
instead of arbitration, would seem to reduce such costs, at least to some degree.
In fact, parties could indeed opt out of arbitration in favor of court adjudication, as long as they
chose a specific court. Assuming broad support of the Hague Convention on Choice of Courts,
the parties‟ choice would be fully effective. Thus, contracts fully addressing issues of dispute
resolution would be unaffected by this change in the default rule. The change in default would
apply only to parties who fail to provide for a dispute resolution forum in their agreement. One
might reasonably ask if this effect will fall disproportionately on smaller, less sophisticated
parties. If so, a default rule providing for arbitration is even more essential.
Large multinational corporations typically have a significant presence in many of the countries in
which they do business—including a legal team. Thus, they are much more likely to be able to
take advantage of a contracting partner‟s own local courts in the event litigation arises.
Moreover, the large multinational corporation, as a defendant, is more likely to have significant
88
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assets in multiple jurisdictions, thus providing a potential plaintiff with a variety of possible
options from which to choose. While arbitration remains the normative preference, a large multinational corporation is somewhat less affected when required to resort to national courts in the
absence of an effective dispute resolution agreement.
In contrast, the small to mid-sized business will likely prefer to rely on its local legal team, and it
will likely have assets only in its home country. This small to mid-sized business is precisely the
sort of party that finds itself between the proverbial “rock and a hard place” in the event a dispute
arises in the absence of an effective arbitration agreement. Does the plaintiff bring suit at home
and then try to collect? Or, conversely, does the plaintiff—often at considerable expense—sue in
the defendant‟s home courts and just hope to be treated in a fair and unbiased manner? In many
cases, neither option will provide a particularly viable choice, and a party may end up
abandoning its claim entirely. It is this small to mid-size business that will almost certainly
benefit the most from a default rule providing for arbitration.93 Thus, we may reasonably find
elements of “consent” to arbitration of international commercial disputes based on traditional
contract principles applicable to majoritarian default rules, generally.
Moreover, a convention providing for arbitration as a default rule and ratified by each
contracting state would provide a positive legal rule, through which one might reasonably find
implied “consent.” By way of analogy, a U.S. court addressing personal jurisdiction based on the
principle of “consent,” may employ a “legal fiction” in finding such “consent” on the theory that
a foreign corporation “consents” to submit to jurisdiction in consequence of doing local
business.”94 In a similar manner, a party engaging in a transaction within the scope of the
proposed convention would be deemed to have “consented” to its application and, thereby,
“consented” to arbitrate any disputes arising thereunder.
In fact, one might reasonably suggest that an implication of consent to a default arbitration
regime in an international commercial transaction is far more reasonable than an implication that
parties impliedly consent to substantive international law under similar circumstances. And yet,
we bind parties buying or selling goods across national borders to the substantive default rules of
the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (the “CISG”), and presumably
believe they are better off for it.
Finally, any proposal that would deprive parties of their right to court access must address the
European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees such access.95 One might reasonably
question whether a default rule providing for arbitration of international commercial disputes, in
the absence of traditional notions of express consent, could reasonably be reconciled with this
convention. A thorough examination of the potential application of the convention is beyond the
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scope of this article. However, the Swiss Supreme Court‟s treatment of “consent” to arbitration
by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) may provide a path to such reconciliation.
An athlete may be bound to CAS arbitration based on completion of a compulsory application to
compete—even as a matter of incorporation by reference where the arbitration agreement is
embodied in the rules of the athletes sport, to which the athlete agrees as a pre-requisite to
participation in that sport.96 This apparent departure from more traditional notions of consent is
justified in the context of sports matters because CAS arbitration is aimed at “favouring the
prompt settlement of disputes, particularly in sports-related matters, by specialised arbitral
tribunals presenting sufficient guarantees of independence and impartiality.”97 In a similar
manner, one might reasonably suggest that arbitration favors prompt settlement of international
commercial disputes by tribunals specializing in such commercial matters and providing for
sufficient guarantees of independence and impartiality. In fact, one might reasonably suggest
that, in the context of a cross-border transaction, an arbitral tribunal is more likely to insure such
expeditious, specialized, impartial resolution of any such dispute. Moreover, national courts
would retain the authority to review any arbitral award based on due process or public policy
concerns, much as in the case of the New York Convention today. Thus, in the same manner that
an athlete‟s decision to compete gives rise to an obligation to arbitrate disputes—without running
afoul of the European Convention on Human Rights—a commercial party‟s decision to conduct
business across national borders would give rise to an obligation to arbitrate all related disputes,
absent an agreement to the contrary.
Ultimately, whether we find consent through contract principles addressing normative default
rules, imply consent from the parties‟ actions in engaging in a transaction governed by a positive
default rule of law, or both, it cannot reasonably be said that a default legal regime providing for
arbitration of international commercial disputes would be wholly lacking in any form of
“consent.” Of course, as with many new ideas, the devil is in the details. Fortunately, a few ideas
for these details can be found in an existing convention.
4.2.2

The Panama Convention and a “Bare Bones” Arbitration Agreement—a
Pre-existing Template for a Default Legal Regime

The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Panama
Convention”) applies to arbitration agreements between parties from contracting states within
North and South America—effectively displacing the New York Convention in those instances.98
While unfortunately omitting any provision directly addressing parallel national court
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proceedings,99 the Panama Convention introduces one particular innovation not found in the
New York Convention.100 It provides that, in the event the parties have not agreed upon any
institutional or other arbitration rules, the rules of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
Commission (“IACAC”) will govern the arbitration.101 These rules are virtually identical to the
original UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976).102
Thus, if the parties simply agree to final and binding arbitration of any dispute related to the
instant contract, their agreement is fully effective, and they are deemed to have impliedly
“consented” to ad hoc arbitration under a set of rules virtually identical to the original
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In a similar fashion, parties deemed to have chosen arbitration by
default under a new convention could be further deemed to have agreed to ad hoc arbitration103
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as a default set of rules to govern their dispute.104 Of
critical importance is Article 6, providing for the designation of an appointing authority by the
Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.105 Thus, the entire
arbitral process would typically take place without any court involvement—even if the
respondent refused to cooperate in that process.106 Of course, an effective arbitration regime
would continue to require a seat—irrespective of whether chosen in advance by the parties in an
express arbitration agreement, or selected later by the arbitrators.107
With a default arbitration regime for dispute resolution, and the application of the UNCITRAL
Rules in the absence of an express party agreement, the issues of lis pendens and the potential for
parallel proceedings virtually disappear. In the case of every international commercial
transaction, the parties would be bound to resolve their disputes: (1) in a mutually agreed upon
national court; (2) through a mutually agreed upon arbitral process; or (3) through a default
99
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arbitral process overseen, as necessary, by the Permanent Court of Arbitration where the parties
are unable to agree to the contrary. The only reason for early resort to national courts would
likely be for preliminary injunctive relief, which typically requires a party to seek relief in a
specific court in the likely place of enforcement. Thus, the proverbial “torpedo” is largely, if not
fully, defused.
As an additional benefit, a default arbitration regime would solve many of the existing
challenges related to joinder of parties. Absent an agreement to the contrary, all parties to a given
transaction or occurrence could effectively be joined in a single arbitration proceeding. This
would arguably go a long way towards resolving a significant problem with the existing
arbitration regime based solely on express consent.108
Admittedly, the idea of arbitration as a default rule likely conjures up prospects of significant
political challenges. However, the principles contained in the New York Convention itself likely
conjured up significant initial political challenges in the face of early 20th century judicial
hostility towards arbitration.109 Often, the success of this sort of “sea change” may be dependent
on its timing. Today, in a global economy looking for savings in public spending, perhaps the
time is right to relieve national courts of the burden of financing unplanned and often abusive
litigation involving arbitration agreements, as well as unplanned litigation of international
commercial disputes, generally.110 Litigation in which the parties fail to agree in advance on the
forum will almost always be more complex, protracted, and expensive. In contrast, arbitration is
almost fully self-sustaining from a financial perspective, relying very little on public courts
except where personal “coercion” of a party is necessary. Perhaps the time has arrived to begin
to take the next step in effective resolution of international commercial disputes.
5

CONCLUSION

Albert Jan van den Berg was right. After more than 50 years, it is time for a new convention. The
New York Convention has been a truly outstanding success, but the needs of modern
international commercial arbitration extend beyond the Convention‟s extraordinarily successful
provisions for recognition and enforcement of awards. The West Tankers case is, of course, only
one of the sign posts pointing towards the need for modernization, but its challenges further
illuminate the difficulty in solving today‟s challenges while continuing to treat international
commercial arbitration as the “exception” instead of the “rule.” The international business
community needs to move beyond mere revisions of the New York Convention. Instead, we need
a new convention that fully recognizes arbitration as the default legal rule for resolution of
international commercial disputes. Admittedly, one can only guess whether the international
community is ready to give serious consideration to such a rule. This article simply suggests that
the time has arrived to have the discussion.
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